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Cq 'jq - I '-It..! 
[Sac. No. 5639. In Bank. Nov. 21. 1944.} 
ROY S. STOCKTON, Responden1i, v. DEPAR'l':\IENT OF 
EMPLOYMEJo\T OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Civil Service-Reinstatement-Judicial Review.-When a de-
cision of the State Personnel Boaro ordering reinstatement 
of a deposed Chief of Division of State Employment Agencies 
with back salary becomes final because the aggrieved party 
ha~ failed (>ither to exhaust his administrativ(> r(>medies or to 
s(>ek judicial redr(>ss. the court!; will not r(>view the merit~ of 
the controversy if the board acted within its jurisdiction. for 
the decision is th(>n imml1D(> from objections in a collatl'ral 
proceeding. 
[2] Id.-Lay-off of Employees-Appeal.-Under State Civil Serv-
ic(> Act. ~ 172 (Stats. 1937. p. 2085. as amended: Deering-'s 
[1] See 3 Cal.JUl. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part). "Civil Serv-
ice," § 11; 10 Am.Jur. 930. 
Melt. Dig. References: (1,6,9-11) Civil Service, § 14: [2] Civil 
Service, § 12.1; [3] Unemployment Relief; [4] State of California, 
US.1; [5] Civil Service, §9; [7) Civil Service, 14.1; (8) Civil 
Service, 1 4.2. 
) 
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Gen Laws, 1941 Supp., Act 1404), authorizing the appointing 
power to layoff employees hecl1nse of la~k of work or fund~ 
or in the intere.,ts o~eronom~', and providin.l!: that nn I'mploye(' 
may appeal to thr Stlltl' Prrson!lrl Roard within ::10 days. 
after receiving noticr of hy-off. on thr ground that t hI' lay-off 
was not mfldr in good f..tth or was otherwise improper, said 
board had .iuri~di~tion to determine thr propriety of the lay-
off of a Chief of Division of State Employment Agencies, 
whose duties were transferred to all,j)ther officer. 
[8] Unemployment Relief - Administration - Abolition of Divi-
sions.-Under Unemployment Insurance Act. § 93 (Stats. 1935. 
p. 1226; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937. Act 8780d) the Employ-
ment Commission has authority to create, abolish or recreate 
divisions from time to time, and the State Personnel Board 
has no jurisdiction to drtermine when or nnder what condi-
tions divisions may be aholished. there heing no provision in 
the State Civil Service Act to review the action of a state 
department in aholi~hine: division~ in thr drpartment. 
[4] State of CaJifornia-Rem')val and Discharge-Effect of Aboli-
tion of Division or Position.- The aholition of a division or 
position doe~ not antomatiral/y separAtE' the employees in the 
division, or the emrlo~'re in thE' pO!'!ition. from thE' state serv-
ice. ThE' power of a department head to abolish a position 
is di~tin('t from his power to layoff an E'mrloyee. 
[51 Civil Service-Removal and Discharge-Effect of Abolition of 
Position.-Undf'r State Civil Service Act. §§ 170, 172. the abo-
lition of a position does not alltom!ltirally result in the lay-off 
of the employee holdin!! thr po!';ition 
[6a,6b] Id. - Reinstatement - Effect of Abolition of Position.-
The abolition of a position by the State Department of Em-
ployment does not nffect til(' State Personnel Board's power 
to order the reinstntement of the former holder of the posi-
tion, wherE' the dnties of his position are still performed but 
by persons who. according to the clRs'lifications made by the 
board under the Rhte Civil Sern!.'e Act. aTe not entitled to 
perform those dnti('~ 
[7] Id.-Classiflcation.-The State Personnel Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction to classify positions in the state civil service. 
(See Const .. art. XXTV. ~ 2(1.'): Stnte Civil Rervice Art. ~§ 60-
63.) 
[8] Id.-Appointment-Performance of Duties of Di1Jerent Class. 
-Whf'n specification~ of a elas!': are adopted by the St.atE' Per-
[4J Power to suspend or layoff public officers or employees for 
a temporary period without pay af; an economy a.nd not a dis-
ciplinary measure, note, 111 A.L.R. 432. See, also, 21 Cal.Jur. 
997; 43 Am.Jur. 65. 
) 
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BOnnel Board, an employee within that class may perform the 
duties of that class; he ma,)'- not perform the duties of a differ-
ent class; nor mayan employee who is not in that class per-
form those duties. (See State Civil Service Act, § 114.) 
[9] Id.-Reinstatement--Rights Under Qrder Granting.-Where, 
pending a mandamus proce('ding to compel compliance with 
an order of the State Pe~nnel Board reinstating a deposed 
Chief of Division of State Employment Agencies, said divi-
sion and all employees therein were inducted into the employ-
ment of the federal government witth civil service status, the 
reinstated chief was entitled under'the board's order to be 
certified to the federal government for induction into the fed-
eral service on the basis of his former position. 
[10] ld.-Reinstatement--Mandamus-Parties Defendant. - In a 
mandamus proceeding against the Department of Employ-
ment, its executive director and other individuals, to compel 
reinstatement of a Chief of Division of State Employment 
Agencies, the Employment Commission, which abolished t.he 
chief's position and ordered his lay-off, was not an ,indispen-
sable party to the proceeding, where the director, under his ap-
pointment by the commission pursuant to Unemployment In-
surance Act, § 88, was the head of the Department of Em-
ployment vested with all duties relating to state civil service, 
and was therefore the only necessary party defendant to carry 
out the order of the State Personnel Board and the order of 
the court. 
[11] ld. - Reinstatement - Salary RecoTerable - Deductions.-A 
civil service employee who has been unlawfully deprived of 
his position is entitled, on his reinstatement, to recover the 
amount of his accrued salary during the period he is pre-
vented from performing his duties, less the amount he has 
received from private or public employment during that period. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. Raymond T. Coughlin, Judge. Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part with directions. 
Proceedings in mandamus to compel reinstatement of peti-
tioner to his former position of Chief of Division of State 
Employment Agencies. Judgment granting writ affirmed in 
part and reversed in part with directions. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor-
ney General, and John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, 
for Appellants. 
, 
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TRA YNOR, J.-l<'rom December 13, 1934, until June 14, 
1940, petitioner held the gosition of Chief of the Division of 
State Employment AgeIlcies, in the classified civil service of 
the state, with permanent civil service status. This division 
was originally in the Department o{ Industrial Relations, but 
was transferred on Juj.v 1, 1936, to the Department of Em-
ployment. On June 14, 1940, the California Emplo~'mellt 
Commission passed a resolution abolishing the uivision. ('0111-
bining its functions with those of, the Director of the Depart-
ment of Emplo~'ffient, and ordering the lay-off of petitioner. 
Petitioner's name was retained on the payroll until July 2:3, 
1940, to enable him to receive compensation for his accmnu-
lated earned vacation time, and was placed on the lay-off list 
as of July 23, 1940. The State Personnel Board, on peti-
tioner's appeal to it under section 172\k) of the State Civil 
Service Act (Stats. 1937, p. 2085, as amended; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1941 Supp., p. 1918, Act 1404) held that the lay-off 
was improper on the ground that respondents failed to comply 
with section 172. and ordered petitioner's reinstaiement with 
back salary. Respondents' petition for rehearing was denied. 
They made no attempt to test the validity of the Personnel 
Board's order in a Judicial proceeding but refused to comply 
with it. A petition for a writ of mandamus was then filed 
with the Superior Court of Sacramento County to compel 
compliance with the board's order. Respondents demurred 
to this petition on the grounds that it did not state a cause 
of action and that there was a misjoinder of parties. The 
demurrer was overruled; the respondents answered; and 
upon the trial the court made findings in favor of petitioner 
and entered its judgment that a peremptory writ of manda-
mus issue directing the reinstatement of the petitioner in 
accord with the order of the Personnel Board. While the ease 
was pending in the superior court, the Division of Employ-
ment Agencies and all employees therein were inducted into 
the employment of the federal government with civil service 
status. Th~ Director of the Department of Employment re-
fused to perform the acts necessary to effect petitioner's in-
duction. The superior court's judgment included provisions 
that the director perform such acts. Respondents appeal from 
the judgment. 
[1] Once the decision of the State Personnel Board be-
eomes final because the aggrieved party has failed either to 
) 
) 
268 STOCKTON V. DEI'ABTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT [25 C.2d 
ezhaust hIs administrative remedies or to seek judicial re-
dress, the courts will not review the merits of the controversy, 
if the board acted within its jurisJiction, for the deciRion is 
then immune from ojlf.1ections in a collateral proceeding. 
(Alexander v. State Personnel Board, 22 Ca1.2d 198 [137 P.2d 
433J; Menzel Estate Co. v. City of Redding, 178 Cal. 474, 
481 [174 P. 48] ; Gurtz v. t1ity "f San Bruno, 8 Cal.App.2d 
399,401 [48 P.2d 142]; lngmliam v. Union Stockyards Co., 
64 F.2d 3!J0, 392.) The question on this appeal therefore is 
whether the Personnel Board acted within its jurisdiction. 
[2] Section 172(a) of the State Civil Service Act pro-
vides: "Whenever it is necessary because of lack of work or 
lack of funds or whenever it is advisable in the interests of 
economy to reduce the staff of any State agency, the appoint-
ing power may layoff employees according to the procedure 
set forth in this act and the rules of the board." Section 172 
and rule 16, sections 1-14, of the "Rules and Regulations of 
the State Personnel Board" adopted pursuant to section 35 of 
the State Civil Service Act and article XXIV of the Califor-
nia Constitution, prescribe the procedure for the lay-off of 
employees. Section 172(k) of the State Civil Service Act pro-
vides: "Any employee may appeal to the board within 30 days 
of receiving notice of lay-off on the grounds that the pro-
cedure herein prescribed has not been complied with or that 
the lay-off has not becn made in good faith or was otherwise 
improper. The board shall within 30 days of such appeal hold 
such hearing or investigation as it may deem necessary. The 
board may also conduct such hearing or investigation within 
30 days of receiving notice of lay-off on its own motion. In 
rendering a decision as a result of any hearing or investiga-
tion held pursuant to this subdivisiun the board may order the 
reinstatement of the employee with or without pay if it ap-
pears that the proper procedure has not been followed or that 
the lay-off was not made in good faith or was otherwise im-
proper." Under these provisions the State Personnel Board 
clearly had jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner's lay-
off was improper. 
[3] Respondents contend, however, that the abolition of 
the Division of Employment Agencies by the California Em-
ployment Commission entailed the abolition of petitioner's 
position, that his lay-off followed of necessity, and that the 
) 
/ 
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State Personnel Board had no jul:isdietion to order his rein-
statemellt to a position that ~ longer existed. Section 93 of 
the California Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, 
eh. :152; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Aet 8780c1) provides: 
"On .July 1, 1946, the Division of State ~mployment Agencies 
of the Depal'tment of Indust~l Relations shall become and 
remain the Division of State Employment Agencies in the De-
partment of Employment. All persons employed in such divi-
sion and the records and property thereof shall, upon such 
change, become the employees, records" and property of the 
Department of Employment. All persons employed in any 
capacity in such division, shall continue and remain in such 
capacity in such division after the change, subject to the power 
of the commission as the governing body of the department to 
abolish such division, change old divisions or create new divi-
sions, change duties and powers of such division, or impose 
upon it new and additional powers and duties." The resolution 
adopted by the California Employment Commission on June 
14, 1940, provided in part: "The existing Division of State 
Employment agencies. as such, (otherwise known as the Divi-
sion of Employment Service) of the Department of Employ-
ment is hereby abolished; and it is hereby ordered that lay-
offs shall be made forthwith from the positions of offices of 
Chief and Associate Chief of said Division. The aforemen-
tioned lay-otIs are hereb~' expressly declared to be for the 
purpose of economy and incrcased efficiency of operations." 
It is clear that the California Employment Commission had 
authority under section 93 of the Unemployment Insurance 
Act to create, abolish, or recreate divisions from time to time. 
There is nothing exceptional about such a power, for most 
state statutes creating departments contain provisions simi-
lar to section 93. Moreover, section 350 of the Political Code, 
a general provision applicable to all departments, authorizes 
the head of each department, with the consent of the Gover-
nor, to consolidate, abolish, or create divisions within the 
department. The State Personnel Board has no jurisdiction 
to determine when or under what conditions divisions may be 
abolished, for the State Civil Service Act contains no provi-
sion authorizing it to review the action of a state department 
in abolishing divisions in the department. 
[4] The abolition of a division or position, however, does 
not automatically separate the employees in the division or 
) 
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the employee in the position from the state service. The power 
of a department head to abolish a position is distinct from his 
power to layoff an employee, just as the creation of a position 
is distinct from the emp]oyn1C'nt of a person to fill the posi-
tion. The creatfon and abolition of divisions or posi1 ions 
within a uepartment a~ matters of departmental organiza-
tion. The employment or lay-off of employees relates to the 
tenure of employees, the classes of positions inthe department, 
t.he duties to be performed by th~ individual employees, and 
the appropriate division of work between classes. The em-
ployment of persons to fill positions and their classification 
are governed by articles 4 and 7 of the State Civil Service Act. 
The separation of employees from the state service, ineluding 
their lay-off, is governed by article 9 (§§ 170-173). Section 
170 provides that the tenure of a permanent employee holding 
a position shall be during good behavior and that the employee 
can be separated from the state service by lay-off, leave of 
absence, suspension, resignation, removal or retirement. Sec-
tion 172 covers lay-offs, including lay-offs resulting from the 
abolition of positions. Subdivision (a) of that section spe-
cifically provides for the lay-off of employees whenever it is 
necessary because of lack of work or funds or whenever it is 
advisable in the interest of economy to reduce the staff of any 
state agency "according to the procedure set forth in the Act 
and the rules of the Board." Subdivision (b) provides that 
the duties performed by the employee or employees so laid off 
may be assigned to any other employee or employees in the 
state agency holding positions in appropriate classes. Subdi-
vision (d) provides that the lay-off shall be made in accord-
ance with the relative efficiency and seniority of the employee 
or employees of the class in which the lay-off is to be made as 
determined by seniority and by performance reports on file 
with the board. Subdivision (e) provides that in the case 
of abolition of position the employee or employees in the class 
under consideration having the lowest combined scores for 
efficiency and seniority shall be laid off up to the number of 
positions to be abolished. Subdivision (f) provides that when 
an employee has previously served the state with permanent 
status in any class below that of the class under consideration 
or its equivalent in any previous classification, the employee 
shall be afforded the option of being demoted to the lower 
No,\". ]944) STOCKTON V. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 271 
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class, in lieu of being laid off, to replace the employee in the 
lower class having the lowest score for efficiency and senior-
ity if that score is lower than that of the employee being 
demoted. Subdivi~n (g) provides that any employee re-
placed by such demotion JIlho has In'eyiousl~' served the state 
'yith permanent status in the class or its equivalent in any 
previous classification below ... that in which he was serving 
at the time of replacement shall h~ve the same option of de· 
motion as though his position were abolished. Subdivision 
(k), quoted above, provides for the appeal by the employee 
to the personnel board in the event of his lay-off. 
[5] It is plain from the foregoing provisions that the 
abolition of a position does not automatically result in the 
lay-off of the employee holding the position. If he is in the 
appropriate class of employees to which his duties would be 
assigned upon the abolition of his position, his efficiency and 
seniority ratings might be such that not he but some other em-
ployee in that class would be laid off. (Section 172(b) (e).) 
He may elect demotion pursuant to section 172(f), and in 
any event he is entitled to an appeal to the State Personnel 
Board to determine whether the prescribed procedure for his 
lay-off was followed and whether his lay-off was made in good 
faith and was otherwise proper. 
In support of their contention that the abolition of peti-
tioner's position effected his separation from the state serv-
ice as a matter of law. respondents rely on Livingstone v. 
MacGi711·vTaY. 1 Ca1.2d 546 [36 P.2d 622] j O'Net'U v. W1.1-
liams. 53 CaJ.App. 1 [Hl9 P. 8701 : Foley v. City of Oakland, 
33 Cal.App. 128 [164 P. 419); State v. City of Seattle, 74 
Wash. ]99 [133 P. 11]; and People v. Hayes, 119 N.Y.S. 808. 
None of those cases, however. involved the application of the 
State Civil Service Act. They all relate to statutes or city 
('hartel's providing that no employee shall be removed except 
for canse, which shall be investigated, and that the employee 
shall be giYen the reasom; for his suspension and an oppor-
t.unit~· to answer them. They do not involve statutes or 
charter provisions, which, like the State Civil Service Act, 
prescribe a procedure in the case of separations from the 
service for reasons of economy. (See 111 A.L.R. 438 and 
cases there cited including Kabisius v. Board of Playground 
& Recreation, 4 CaL2d 488 [50 P.2d 1040] ; Hrabak v. Los An-
geles, 10 Cal.App.2d 383 [51 P.2d 1136].) In contrast to such 
) 
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provisions, the State Civil Service Act has broadened the 
protection to state emplo~'ees by including in the statutory 
plan, distinct from any pro~dure concerning discipline, a 
special lay-off 'Procedure in tbe event the separation of the 
employee from the service is occasioned by the 3holition of 
positions or other economy measures. 
Section 172 (k) of the l:;tate Civil Ser~ice Act provides that 
"in rendering a decision as a result of any hearing or inves-
tigation held pursuant to this subdivision the board may order 
the reinstatement of the employee with or without pay, if it 
appears that the proper procedure hM not been followed or 
that the lay-off was not made in good faith or was otherwise 
improper." [6a] The abolition of a position by the respon-
dent~ cloes not affect the State Personnel Board's power to 
order the reinstatement of the former holder of the position 
where the duties of his position are still performed but by 
persons who, according to the classifications made by the 
board under the State Civil Service Act, are not entitled to 
perform those duties. [7] The State Personnel Board has 
exclusive jurisdiction to classify positions in the state civil 
service. (Cal. Const., art. XXIV, § 2(c); State Civil Service 
Act. ~§ 60-63.) [8] When specifications of a class are 
adopted. the employee within that class may perform the du-
ties of that class: he may not perform the duties of a differ-
ent class: nor mayan employee who is not in that class per-
form those duties. (State Civil Service Act, § 114.) In the 
memorandum of points and authorities filed by the board as 
amiclls curiae at the request of the trial court, the board has 
set forth that petitioner's position was in a class that required 
the performance of certain specified duties listed in the com-
plaint. The board takes the position that no other employee 
could perform those duties and that after the abolition of 
fJetitioner's position the duties were illegally performed by 
other persons. making it necessary for the board to order the 
reinstatement of petitioner. [6b] Whatever the merits of 
the board'!'; decision. which we do not pass upon i.n this attack 
upon its order, it is clear that the abolition of the position 
did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to order petitioner'S 
reinstatement under section 172 (k) of the State Civil Service 
Act. The board has determined that petitioner's lay-off was 
improper and that his employment in the state service was 
) 
) 
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not terminated. [9] Since the branch of the service in 
whicli he was employed has meanwhile become part of the 
federal service, petiticfner is entitled under the board's order 
to be certified to the federal government for indnetion into 
the frdrral service on the basis of his former position. 
[10] Respondents c09Send tllat petitioner cannot have re-
lief by mandamus against the Department of Employment, 
its executive director, and the other respondents, on the 
ground that the California Employment Commission, which 
abolished petitioner'R position ana' instructed the Director of 
the Department of Employment to order the lay-off. is an 
indispensable party to the action. PurSuant to se('tion SR of 
the Unemployment Act of the Employment CommiRSion ap-
pointed a Director of the Department of Employment and 
authorized him "to perform or l'Iupervise the performanee of 
all dnties required under the Civil Service Act and the nlles 
and regulations of the State Personnel Roard with the as-
sistance of the departmental pernonnel officer." Such an au-
thorization is reeoginzed for the purpose.s of the Civil Service 
Act by section 234 thereof providing: "Whenever. by the 
provisions of this act. a power is granted or a duty imposed 
upon an appointing power, the power may be exercised or the 
duty performed by a deputy of the appointing power or by 
a person authorized pursuant to law by him. unless it is 
expressl~' otherwise provided." Under the appointment of 
the Employment Commission. the director was the head of 
t.he Department of Employment vested with all duties re-
lating to the state civil service and was therefore the only 
necessary party defendant to carry out the order of the State 
Personnel Board and the orner of the court. (See Barber v. 
Mulford, 117 Cal. 356 r49 P. 206] ; City and County of San 
Francisco v. Linares. ]6 Ca1.2d 441 fI06 P.2d 639]: Taylor 
v. Burks, 6 Cal.App. 22!) r9] P. 814]: Tape v. Hurley, 66 
Cal. 473 16 P. 1291: see. also. ('Jalifornia .'lecuritie.~ ('Jo. v. 
State, III Cal.App. 258. 261 r295 P. !'i831.) 
The trial court ordered the allowance of petitioner's full 
salary from July 20. 1940, with no dedu('tion of remuneration 
from private or publie employment that he may have received 
since that date. [11] It is settled that a civil service em-
ployee who has been llulawfnl1y deprived of hiR position is 
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the period he is prevented from performing his duties, less 
the amount he has rfcch'ed from private or public employ-
ment during that period (State Board of Equalization v. 
Superior Court, 20 Ca1.2d 467, 474 [127 P.2d 4]: Wiles v. 
State Personne~ Board. 19 Cal:'2d 344 [121 P.2d 673] ; Kelly 
v. State Personnel Board. :n Cal.App.2d 443 r88 P.2d 264].) 
The order of the State Personnel Board that petitioner "be 
granted his salary" from and after .July 20. 1940. must be 
interpreted in the Iig-ht of this rule. 'I'hat part of the judg-
ment of the trial court determining the amount of salary due 
petitioner for the period since Jul~' 20. 1940, is reversed, and 
the trial court is directed to take evidence as to the remunera-
tion received by petitioner from private or public employment 
after July 20, 1940, and to deduct any amount so received 
from the monthly salary for the period covered by such em-
ployment, and to enter judgment for petitioner for any bal-
ance. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
21, 1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
